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The United States Army is undergoing force structure 
and doctrinal changes to meet the evolving threats facing 
the nation.  To fulfill operational requirements brought 
about by these changes, Army aviation is developing the 
RAH-66 Comanche.  As a precursor to the Comanche being 
fielded in operational units, the aircraft must perform to 
standard during its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
(IOTE).  
The Army must fashion the IOTE to ensure the Comanche 
meets the requirements of the future force.  To do this, 
test scenarios must focus on placing the aircraft in 
environments and situations in which it will be expected to 
operate.  Test scenarios must be kept technically and 
tactically sound to provide accurate and realistic 
information. 
This thesis identifies scenarios which encapsulate 
future requirements brought about by the Army’s migration 
to the Objective Force. The scenarios have been developed 
to test and evaluate operational effectiveness measures of 
performance.  The scenarios reflect the early stages of the 
Future Combat System (FCS) due to Comanche being the first 
  v
system tested.  As doctrine and the systems that comprise 
FCS continue to evolve, it is recommended to ensure the 
scenarios remain updated to reflect the most current 
information and equipment.  Recommendations also include 
methods to alleviate resource constraints. 
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As threats against the United States continue to 
change, Army leadership has identified a new direction the 
Army must take to meet them.  To become more lethal, agile, 
and responsive, the Army is reshaping to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century.  This reshaping, known as 
the Future Combat System (FCS), requires new equipment and 
systems with increased capabilities.   
 The first piece of the FCS will be the RAH-66 Comanche 
helicopter.  This helicopter is designed to be a 
substantial improvement over aircraft in use today.  As 
part of the acquisition process, the helicopter must go 
through an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE).  
The IOTE places the aircraft in as realistic operational 
situations as possible, and determines how well the 
aircraft performs. This test and evaluation serves as the 
final exam to determine if the aircraft will go forward 
into full production and fielding within the service.   
  1
 This thesis introduces potential scenarios to be used 
in the IOTE.  The scenarios focus on incorporating new 
doctrine, and the Comanche’s role in its execution.  If the 
Comanche is going to be the backbone of Army Aviation for 
the next 25+ years as planned, the aircraft must prove to 




The purpose of this thesis is to provide scenarios 
that can be used in the IOTE.  The FCS not only requires 
new equipment, but also new doctrine describing how the FCS 
will fight.  The scenarios included here incorporate this 




This thesis provides background and discusses IOTE’s 
role in the acquisition process.  The scope of this thesis 
will be limited to IOTE scenarios that provide realistic 
operational events to test the Comanche’s ability to 
perform as part of the FCS.  Each scenario is fashioned to 
be comprehensive, testing as many operational effectiveness 





This thesis focuses on the requirements that the 
Comanche must exhibit to provide the capabilities the Army 
requires in its FCS aircraft.  The analysis is based on 
literature research from books, theses, briefings, web 
sites, documents and discussions.  The majority of research 
centers on the current Operational Requirements Document, 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan, Operational Mode Summary, 
and operational effectiveness Measures of Performance.  
These documents will be analyzed to determine their 
completeness in regards to capabilities that must be 
fielded to meet the needs of FCS.  The findings of this 
research will be utilized to fashion scenarios for IOTE, 
which provide an accurate means to assess the Comanche’s 




 In Chapter II, background information is provided on 
the Army’s Future Combat System, dendritics, and aviation 
conceptual operations as part of the FCS.  Chapter III 
describes IOTE scenarios.  Included in each scenario is the 
operational effectiveness dendritic, shaded to reflect the 
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level of opportunity in that scenario to test each of the 
Measures of Performance.  Chapter IV provides analysis of 
the IOTE scenarios, starting with the commonalities in MOP 
and capabilities tested.  Following that, each scenario is 
analyzed individually, detailing the unique focus each 
scenario was designed to highlight.  The chapter concludes 
with methods to minimize costs should funding constraints 
arise.  Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations, 
and suggested further studies. 
  4




As the Army transforms to meet the threats of the 21st 
century, the resulting changes encompass the entire force.  
The Army’s Objective Force not only calls for newer, more 
technologically advanced equipment, but also requires 
changes in organizational makeup and doctrine to most 
effectively employ this new equipment.  This chapter 
defines the purpose of Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOTE), and provides a synopsis of the 
formulation of testing procedures, based upon the dendritic 
method.  The chapter concludes with the future Concept of 
Operations (CONOPs) Army aviation envisions conducting as 
part of the future combined arms team. 
  
B. INITIAL OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION. 
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The IOTE is a field test, under realistic operational 
conditions, of a production or production-representative 
system (or key component of such a system) to determine its 
operational effectiveness and operational suitability for 
use by typical users in combat or when otherwise deployed.  
The Initial Operational Test environment is as 
operationally realistic as possible including realistic 
threat systems.  Typical users operate and maintain the 
system under conditions simulating actual deployment 
conditions. [Ref. 1]  Because of the increasing cost of 
conducting tests, testers and evaluators must be focused on 
the important and highly sensitive operational issues 
needed to ensure successful fielding of a new system. [Ref. 
2]   
These costs and operational issues become even more 
important for new systems, such as aircraft, that require 
extensive training of the operators.  In most cases, the 
proficiency of the individuals employing the system 
dictates success or failure.  Therefore, not only must 
tests be planned and executed to capture the data necessary 
to answer the right questions, users must be adequately 
trained to employ the system correctly.   
 Testers and evaluators have very different 
responsibilities in the IOTE process.  The operational 
tester is the Army command or agency that plans, conducts 
and executes operational tests, including early user test 
and experimentation (EUTE), Force Development Test and 
Experimentation (FDTE), Initial Operational Test (IOT), and 
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follow-on operational test (FOT). The operational tester 
will provide Test Results (TRs) directly to the program 
manager and the Army System Acquisition Review Council 
(ASARC) or Interim Program Review (IPR) body. [Ref. 1]  The 
operational evaluator is the Army command or agency that 
addresses the operational effectiveness and suitability of 
systems to be acquired by determining the degree to which 
the system's Critical Operational Issue and Criteria (COIC) 
have been satisfied. The operational evaluator will provide 
evaluation reports directly to the program manager and 
ASARC, IPR, or MAISRC review body. The operational evaluator 
will continuously evaluate all assigned systems.  [Ref. 1]  
More simply, operational testers will put the system through 
its paces conducting the test, operational evaluators take 
the information derived from the tests, and evaluate it to 





 A dendritic is a tool to develop and see 
relationships.  It is similar to a tournament playoff 
ladder except that it is reversed; it starts with a single 
line and then separates into more detailed levels as one 
decomposes the elements of the structure.  The technique 
results in a tree-like structure with several branches 
emanating from each juncture. [Ref. 3]  The process of 
creating the dendritic facilitates the identification of 
critical issues, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures 
of Performance (MOP), and data requirements.  The entire 
dendritic structure is a series of questions that start 
with the issue, and flows down to potentially hundreds of 
data requirements.  The data requirements then facilitate 
developing the test plan for a system. By identifying the 
data requirements necessary to answer the questions posed 
in the dendritic, testers can formulate tests to capture 
the necessary data. 
 Critical issues are stated as broad questions, and 
defined as any aspect of the proposed system’s capability 
that must be tested in order to determine the system’s 
operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. 
Operational effectiveness is defined as the overall degree 
of mission accomplishment of a system when used by 
representative personnel in the environment planned or 
expected (for example, natural, electronic, threat, and so 
forth) for operational employment of the system considering 
organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, 
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vulnerability, and threat (including countermeasures; 
initial nuclear weapons effects; nuclear, biological, and 
chemical contamination threats).  Operational suitability 
is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed 
in field use with consideration given to availability, 
compatibility, transportability, interoperability, 
reliability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, 
human factors, manpower supportability, logistic 
supportability, and training requirements.  Finally, 
operational survivability is the capability of a system and 
its crew to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile 
environment without suffering an abortive impairment of its 
ability to accomplish its designated mission. [Ref. 1] 
 These issues then form the basis of the Test Plan. 
[Ref. 3]  There will be at least one dendritic for each of 
these three areas.  For example, the issue identified for 
use in the Comanche dendritic for effectiveness questions, 
“How well does the Comanche equipped unit conduct 
operations?”  This subjective question serves to start the 
dendritic process, but will have to be further broken down 
before it can be answered.   
 After identifying issues the test plan must answer, 
MOEs are formulated to begin to find the answers.  MOEs are 
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defined as a measure of operational success that must be 
closely related to the objective of the mission or 
operation being evaluated, for example, kills per shot, 
probability of kill, effective range, etc.  A meaningful 
MOE must be quantifiable and a measure to what degree the 
real objective is achieved. [Ref. 4]  Evaluators must also 
ensure that MOEs remain relevant, complete, and precisely 
defined.  Of crucial importance as well is to keep the MOEs 
mutually exclusive.   
 MOEs are further broken down into MOPs.  These are 
measures of lowest level of performance representing 
subsets of MOEs.  Examples are speed, payload, range, time 
on station, frequency, or other identifiable objective 
performance features. [Ref. 4]   
 The dendritic process does not end with MOPs however.  
The final two levels of breakout required to answer the 
MOPs are defined as data elements, and data collection 
requirements.  Data elements are the objective, numerical, 
or yes/no questions, which when pooled together, answers 
MOPs.  The base of the dendritic sequence is the data 
collection requirement.  Data collection requirements are 
those items that can be collected at a single location, and 
generally requires no judgment on the part of the data 
  10
collector. [Ref. 3]  These data collection requirements, 
when answered, provide the necessary information to work 
your way from right to left on the dendritic, enabling 
testers to gather the necessary data requirements to answer 
MOPs, which in turn should answer MOEs, which in turn 
answers the issue.  Figure 1 clarifies what is a logical 
and intelligible progression. 
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Figure 1. Dendritic Approach to Test & Evaluation 
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Figures 2 and 3 show the current operational 
effectiveness dendritic for the RAH-66, to include 
additional MOPs acknowledging the Comanche’s requirement to 
interoperate with off-board sensors. [Ref 9] 
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MOP 1-1-2-5: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly identified by Comanche 
system out of the total number of targets 
detected. 
MOE 1-1-1: Ability of 
Comanche to conduct 
maneuver operations 
from locations about 
the battlefield during 
day and night, NBC 
conditions, adverse 
weather, battlespace 
obscurants, and high 
and hot environments
MOE 1-1-2:  ability of 
Comanche to 
observe and acquire 
and prioritize targets 
in various conditions 
on the battlefield. 
MOP 1-1-2-4: Proportion of ground and air  
targets correctly recognized by Comanche 
out of the total number of targets detected. 
MOP 1-1-1-3: Success rate achieved by the 
Comanche’s  pilotage system(Fwd Looking 
Infrared and Image Intensifier) in providing 
crew members the ability to fly specified 
conditions and modes.
MOP 1-1-2-7: Distribution of the number of 
false targets and false detection’s by 
Comanche crew members.
MOP 1-1-1-6: Proportion of Comanche‘s 
specified  performance qualities successfully 
met. 
MOP 1-1-2-6: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly prioritized by Comanche 
system out of the total  number of targets 
detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-1: Time Comanche takes to 
detect, classify, recognize, identify, prioritize 
targets. 
MOP 1-1-2-2: Proportion of ground and air 
targets detected by Comanche aircraft out of 
the total number of operationally important 
targets
MOP 1-1-2-3: Proportion of ground  and air 
targets correctly classified by Comanche 
aircraft out of the total number of targets 
MOP 1-1-1-5:  Proportion of Comanche’s  
specified handling qualities successfully met.
MOP 1-1-1-2: Percentage of intended 
information successfully provided by  
Comanche’s digital map, mission planning 
station, target engagement, and  threat 
awareness for situational awareness. 
MOP 1-1-1-4:  Percentage of events 
successfully accomplished as a result of the 
Comanche’s crew station interface. (MFD, 
HIDSS CWA)
MOP 1-1-1-1: Percent of times Comanche 








defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. 
Criterion 1-1a: The 
Comanche equipped 




as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 







































































Tabl Operational Effectiveness e 1b.  Comanche 
Criterion 1-1c:  The 
Comanche equipped 
unit must meet the 
Commanders Attack 
Mission requirements 
as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. 
Dendritic MOP 1-1-4-3:   Operational proportion of 


















































MOE 1-1-3:  ability of 
the Comanche crew 




MOE 1-1-4: the 
ability of the 
Comanche crew to 
develop the situation, 
defend itself and 
attack using its own 
or other weapon 
systems. 
MOP 1-1-3-2:  Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).
MOP 1-1-3-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to tactically 
communicate battlefield information. 
MOP 1-1-3-3:  Proportion of successful  
tactical digital  communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).    
MOP 1-1-3-5:  Proportion of successful digital 
communications external Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-3-4: Proportion of successful voice 
communications external to Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-4-4:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to handover 
target data. 
MOP 1-1-4-5:   Proportion of successful 
synchronized Combined Arms Team 
engagements against operationally 
significant targets.
MOP 1-1-4-6:   Proportion of successful 
coordinated Joint engagements against 
operationally significant targets. 
MOP 1-1-4-2:  Distribution of the number of 
targets hit by Comanche helicopter teams 
against threat  forces (Gunnery Phase). 
MOP 1-1-4-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to engage 
threat systems. 
MOP 1-1-4-7:  Proportion of engagements 
whereby the sighting system provided 
required information. (Tracking of targets, 
locating targets, & pre-point operations.) 
MOP 1-1-4-8: Proportion of engagements 
where by laser designation/range finder 
provided required information. (Range, 
boresight retention, designation, & 
divergence). 
MOP 1-1-3-6: Proportion of successful 
employment of off-board sensors. 
MOP 1-1-3-7: Proportion of synthesizing off-
board sensor information into Comanche 
MEP during flight operations. 
D. THE ARMY’S FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS) 
The Future Combat System will be a multi-functional, 
multi-mission re-configurable system of systems to maximize 
joint inter-operability, strategic transportability and 
commonality of mission roles including direct and indirect 
fire, air defense, reconnaissance, troop transport, counter 
mobility, non-lethal and C2 on the move.  The FCS is 
envisioned to be an ensemble of manned and potentially 
unmanned combat systems, designed to ensure that the 
Objective Force is strategically responsive and dominant at 
every point on the spectrum of operations from non-lethal 
to full-scale conflict. [Ref 5] 
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The Future Combat Systems solution will not be a 
single vehicle system. While it may turn out that the 
functional and tactical requirements for FCS can be 
achieved by a single vehicle system or platform, it is 
equally reasonable to think that the requirements may best 
be met by one or more vehicle system sets. The FCS could be 
a distributed network centric system with all of the 
functionality necessary to be successful on the modern 
battlefield distributed among multiple vehicle elements 
whose capabilities sum to the capabilities necessary for 
victory in all forms of combat. This versatility will be 
realized through emphasis on an open architecture system 
concept, with an easily upgradeable and tailorable design 
approach to enable the system to engage in different 
missions as needed. 
A vital aspect of FCS will be the capability to 
rapidly project a dominant force anywhere in the world 
within days. This strategically deployable, tactically 
superior and sustainable force will provide a quick 
reaction capability for future conflicts.  To accomplish 
this, the objective of the Future Combat Systems effort is 
to develop lightweight (no individual element greater than 
20 tons), overwhelmingly lethal, strategically deployable, 
self-sustaining and survivable combat and combat support 
forces, systems and supporting technologies for the 2012-
2025 timeframe and beyond.  Another crucial capability 
which the FCS force must incorporate, is the ability to 
gather and exploit information dominance to develop a 
common, relevant operating picture and achieve battlespace 
situational understanding between the entire air-ground 






E. ARMY AVIATION CONOPS AS PART OF FCS  
 
In developing IOTE requirements for the Comanche, it 
is necessary to formulate scenarios based upon doctrine 
with which the aircraft will be employed.   The exact 
doctrine has not been finalized, but one theme that 
pervades all drafts to date is aviation assets taking on a 
more critical and inclusive warfighting role.  The Army’s 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has developed a 
draft set of CONOPs (Concept of Operations) which Army 
aviation will need to accomplish as part of the objective 
force.  The goal of these updated missions focuses on fully 
integrating aviation into all operations of the air-ground 
team.  To accomplish this goal, TRADOC has identified six 
missions which aviation must accomplish as part of the 
combat team.  These are: reconnaissance, mobile strike, 
close combat with ground forces, division air assault of a 
battalion, multi-modal operational maneuver, and battle 
command on the move. [Ref. 6]  Many of these new missions 
encompass much of what Army aviation has been called on to 
do in the past, but demand increased capabilities.  Future 
missions will require Army Aviation to operate across 
greater frontages and deeper into enemy areas.  These 
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missions will also demand a level of interoperability with 
Army ground forces, as well as other services’ forces, to a 
greater extent than ever before.  Scouts of the future 
require better sensors to detect threats from safer 
distances and low observable technology to defeat infrared 
radiation seeking and radar guided air defense. Also 
crucial are communications systems to talk at the greater 




On the surface, this “new” mission has been conducted 
by Aviation, particularly Air Cavalry, for decades.  In 
fact, the underlying critical tasks required of aviation as 
part of the team conducting reconnaissance for the 
objective force remain the same:  gain and maintain enemy 
contact, orient on the reconnaissance objective, report 
rapidly and accurately, retain freedom to maneuver, develop 
the situation, and ensure maximum reconnaissance assets are 
forward, have not changed at all. [Ref. 7]  Technological 
enhancements, however, improve the manner and capabilities 
with which the Army, and other services, can conduct 
reconnaissance.  
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To be successful, Army aviation must leverage these 
new technologies into a more effective platform with which 
to implement the fundamentals.  To accomplish this, 
according to TRADOC, new aircraft must be able to detect, 
identify and affiliate targets, maintain communications 
with all members of the air-ground team, develop and share 
the common picture of the battlefield, and have the ability 
to dynamically re-task sensors. [Ref. 6]  Dynamically re-
tasking sensors involves operators forward in the vicinity 
of the enemy and conducting missions in aircraft, having 
the ability to shift non-organic sensors to new objectives, 
from their own cockpit.  An example of this would be a 
aeroscout deployed forward conducting a zone 
reconnaissance, shifting a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(TUAV) from its current Named Area of Interest (NAI), to 
another location to cover gaps or an unexpected event, such 
as losing an aircraft to enemy fire. 
All of these requirements lead to the ultimate purpose 
of reconnaissance: provide the commander timely and 
accurate information to take decisive action at the time 
and place of his choosing.  Future aviation systems will be 
called upon to accomplish this to a greater extent than any 
system currently fielded by the Army. 
  19
2. Mobile Strike 
 
The purpose of mobile strike is to combine ground 
based fires, attack aviation, and joint assets to mass 
effects in order to isolate and destroy key enemy forces 
and capabilities.  Mobile strike also serves to shield 
friendly forces as they maneuver out of contact. [Ref. 6]   
 To accomplish this mission, aviation assets are placed 
as needed throughout the battlespace, most likely past the 
Forward Line of Troops (FLOT).  However, should the 
battlespace prove to be non-contiguous, aviation assets 
must maneuver wherever needed.  This puts a human in the 
decision and execution loop who is in position to make 
timely decisions.  Additionally, being in the proximity of 
the enemy enables better synchronization of direct sensors 
and fires.  The ability to quickly recognize gaps in the 
zone of reconnaissance, re-task an off board sensor to fill 
the gap, or maneuver the aircraft to fill the gap itself, 
will prove invaluable.  Conversely, if the reconnaissance 
objective is detected, having a human in the loop forward 
also enables the retasking of sensors to provide 
redundancy.  Redundancy is crucial to maintaining contact 
with the enemy should they be on the move in difficult 
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terrain.  Likewise, as with the case of having a gap in the 
reconnaissance effort, the aircraft can maneuver in this 
instance to become directly involved in gaining contact 
with the enemy force. [Ref. 6] 
Besides the ability to better synchronize sensors, 
there will also be the ability to better synchronize fires.  
Putting a human forward with the ability to control effects 
after munitions are in flight, and control the terminal 
effects in the Engagement Area (EA), will greatly improve 
the FCS’ lethality.  Another benefit will be the ability to 
quickly assess the success of the strike.  If the strike 
accomplishes the desired endstate quickly, subsequent 
strikes can be redirected to other targets, saving 
ammunition.  On the other hand, if the volley of fire does 
not accomplish the mission, additional assets can be 
brought to bear until the desired outcome is met.  
To accomplish this envisioned mobile strike, aviation 
assets will be required to detect, identify, and affiliate 
targets, have the capability for Beyond Line of Sight 
(BLOS)/Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) communications, and have 
the ability to dynamically re-task sensors.  Also required 
will be the ability to direct/employ precision weapons, and 
to share a common architecture with the Joint/Army fire 
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support system.  The most crucial element to success, 
however, is the ability of aviation assets to share a 
common operating picture with all the members of the air-
ground team. [Ref. 6]   
 
3. Close Combat with Ground Forces 
 
The purpose of the close combat with ground forces 
mission is to conduct decisive, integrated air-ground 
operations to close with and destroy the enemy through fire 
and maneuver or tactical assault.  The key to success in 
this case is for aviation assets to stay in close support 
of the ground forces in contact with the enemy.  Airborne 
platforms are well suited for this due to their superior 
ability to fire and maneuver utilizing terrain and standoff 
capabilities.  These same abilities also enable aviation 
systems to stretch the enemy, bypassing his strengths to 
attack weakness, presenting him with multiple/simultaneous 
dilemmas from which he cannot escape.  Similar to this is 
the ability to extend the tactical reach of maneuver 
forces.  Commanders are able to engage the enemy with 
direct fires, or with human in the loop indirect fires, at 
much greater ranges due to the airborne assets superior 
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effective fire range and vantage point.  With the ability 
to move rapidly, virtually unimpeded throughout the 
battlespace, in conjunction with its long-range accurate 
fire, aviation is ideally suited to augment success or 
shore up weakness.    
 Another advantage afforded the combat team in this 
scenario is a superior command and control platform with 
which to control the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) of the 
fight.  With superior connectivity to multiple sensors on 
the battlefield, coupled with the ability to maneuver 
directly to gain eyes on the critical point, envisioned 
aviation assets would be the ultimate platform from which 
to gather critical battlefield information for the close 
fight.  Crucial to managing the close fight is the ability 
to synchronize all available fires on the enemy force.  
This calls for superior situational awareness, provided by 
a common operating picture between all friendly elements, 
as well as the ability to communicate with those elements.  
All of these parameters are designed into Army aviation’s 





4. Division Air Assault of a Battalion 
 
The purpose of this mission is to allow battalion-size 
mounted or dismounted elements the ability to extend 
tactical reach, negate the effects of terrain, seize key 
nodes, attain surprise, and dislocate or isolate the enemy.  
To accomplish this, friendly forces would ingress multiple 
routes to multiple Landing Zones (LZ).  Obviously 
scout/attack aircraft would not accomplish the lifting of 
personnel or equipment, but still are absolutely critical 
for this CONOPs.  
Lift aircraft, by their design, do not carry much in 
terms of firepower.  For this reason, air assault missions 
employ scout/attack aircraft to provide enroute, as well as 
LZ security.  Scout/attack aircraft, as part of providing 
LZ overwatch, also provide guidance for indirect fires if 
needed.  Future systems will have the ability to provide 
better security due to their ability to tie into the entire 
gamut of sensors deployed across the battlespace.  Instead 
of being limited to providing immediate security as far as 
their organic sensors can range, future systems can tap 
into or direct assets such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), or other service’s assets like JSTARS.  Once enemy 
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forces are detected by any of these sensors, scouts in the 
future aviation platform will be well equipped to employ 
joint assets, or direct fire, to destroy the enemy. 
Tacit to this mission as well is the ability to 
quickly transition to the close combat CONOP once ground 
forces are positioned after drop-off.  Perhaps most 
critical, however, is having a human in the loop forward to 
quickly assess surprises/opportunities, and take 
appropriate actions based on the situation. 
As part of the FCS air-ground team conducting a 
division air assault of a battalion, the future 
scout/attack aircraft will need to possess superior 
capabilities.  Namely, Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)/Non-Line 
of Sight communications (NLOS), the ability to share the 
red/blue Common Operations Picture (COP) with all the air-
ground team members, as well as the ability to dynamically 
re-task organic and non-organic sensors.  Additionally, the 
rapid detection, identification, and affiliation of 
targets, along with the capability to synchronize joint and 





5. Multi-Modal Operational Maneuver 
 
The purpose of multi-modal operational maneuver is to 
expose the entire enemy Area of Operations (AO) to direct 
attack, in order to separate echelons, prevent massing, and 
deny enemy reinforcement.  By attacking and disrupting his 
entire framework of operations, and breaking his forces 
into disjointed pieces, friendly elements will be able to 
dictate the terms of engagement.  History has shown that 
the force able to fight on its own terms is rarely 
defeated. 
The future combat system will implement this CONOP by 
conducting both air and ground maneuver.  The air portion 
will conduct advance reconnaissance to gain and maintain 
situational understanding in the AO.  At the appropriate 
time, aviation assets will synchronize joint and organic 
fires to shape the battlespace to create a favorable 
environment.  Multiple operations such as this will take 
place throughout the battlespace simultaneously.  The enemy 
will be forced to react to attacks throughout his own AO, 
against command and control, logistics, as well as combat 
forces.  Forcing him to react does not allow him the 
opportunity to conduct coordinated attacks of his own.   
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The requirements for aviation systems to conduct this 
mission mirrors the requirements from the CONOPS described 
earlier in this chapter: 
• BLOS/NLOS communications 
• Capability to dynamically re-task sensors 
• Capability to detect, identify, & affiliate 
targets 
 
• Capability to synchronize joint and organic 
fires 
 
• Common/shared red/blue COP with all members of 
the air-ground team. 
 
 
6. Battle Command on the Move 
 
The purpose of battle command on the move is to 
provide command and control (C2) for the air-ground team 
forward, untethered to an operations center if needed.  
When the situation dictates, the Comanche must be equipped 
to provide the commander the necessary tools to command and 
control the air-ground team as a primary mission. [Ref. 8]  
This is currently an incredibly difficult endeavor to 
conduct successfully for larger fighting forces from mobile 
facilities.   
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To effectively conduct C2 at battalion and higher 
levels, leaders must have a thorough understanding of more 
than friendly and enemy force dispositions.  They must also 
have access to BDA, friendly logistics status, common 
combined arms graphics, … incredible amounts of information 
to collect, analyze, and develop.  The information 
processing requirements are so great that current practice 
requires a fixed Tactical Operations Center (TOC), with a 
large staff, to handle it all.  The future forces’ 
capability to readily share information, creating a robust 
common operating picture, lessens the need for reliance on 
the TOC.  The optimal command and control scenario remains 
a secure location out of contact, with real time 
information feeds, providing total situational awareness to 
a commander with a complete and knowledgeable staff to aid 
in decision-making.  However, if the situation dictates, 
the Comanche should afford the force a mobile operations 
center capable of directing the air-ground team for short 
durations.   
The Comanche will have to accomplish the following to 
successfully conduct battle command on the move: 
• Orchestrate sensors to develop the situation 
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• Direct maneuver to positions of advantage, 
increasing agility and mobility of the force 
 
• Develop and share COP with all members of the 
air-ground team 
 
• Issue and receive fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) 
with combined arms graphics 
 
• Maintain communications with all members of the 
air-ground team 
 
• Synchronize fires, maneuver, and tactical assault 
on objective for decisive operations.  [Ref. 6]   
 
 
The system requirements to carry out these tasks continue 
to mirror those of the other CONOPS.  The most critical 





The Army requires new aircraft to fully accomplish its 
future missions of reconnaissance, mobile strike, close 
combat with ground forces, division air assault of a 
battalion, multi-modal operational maneuver, and battle 
command on the move.  These new aircraft must be able to 
seamlessly interoperate with other forces, over greater 
distances, and be more lethal than ever before.   
 IOTE provides users the ability to employ equipment in 
realistic situations, and thereby judge the equipment’s 
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ability to meet user requirements.  To verify the 
Comanche’s ability to meet user requirements, and thereby 
become the Army’s first piece of the FCS, it must perform 
acceptably during IOTE.  IOTE then, must be fashioned in 
such a way as to place the aircraft in situations that 
mimic the stringent demands of users during war fighting.  
To facilitate the process of crafting the IOTE, those 
involved use dendritics, which start by identifying the 
broad requirements necessary for the aircraft to be 
successful.  From these broad statements, dendritics 
further break down into MOEs and MOPs, and finally data 
elements, which when answered in total, provide an 
objective means to gauge how well the aircraft performed.   
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The mission scenarios presented in this chapter are 
intended to serve as a basis for the Comanche IOTE test 
vignettes.  These scenarios are based on the author’s 
operational experience in several cavalry organizations, 
both divisional and regimental, as well as discussions with 
members of the test and evaluation community. 
The Army’s transformation to the Future Combat Systems 
provides significant challenges in defining adequate and 
accurate test events.  IOTE for the Comanche presents a 
challenge in that not only must the aircraft meet its own 
performance objectives, but must also integrate with the 
FCS.  The ability to test the aircraft’s interoperability 
with the Future Combat System will prove difficult because 
all the systems that comprise the FCS will not be ready to 
test at the same time.  In fact, the requirements for many 
of the systems that make up the FCS have not been 
finalized.   
The scenarios presented here apply specifically to the 
Comanche’s ability to meet its operational effectiveness 
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requirements.  The following primary documents were used in 
developing the scenarios:  the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD), the Operational Mode Summary/Mission 
Profiles (OPMODSUM) for the RAH-66, the effectiveness 
dendritic presented in Chapter II, and the draft CONOPs.   
As the ORD and OPMODSUM were written prior to defining 
FCS and the associated CONOPs, the mission scenarios 
presented here will add to or modify the concepts and 
requirements presented in earlier documents.  Most of the 
requirements between the new and old missions remain the 
same.  For example, the reconnaissance mission described in 
the OPMODSUM requires many of the same tasks as the 
reconnaissance mission described in the new CONOPs.  
Parallels can be drawn from every mission detailed in the 
OPMODSUM, and requirements from the ORD, to every mission 
listed as part of the future CONOPs.  However, the 
requirements placed on the Comanche to fight as part of the 
envisioned FCS translates into additional tasks that do not 
appear in the OPMODSUM, and to a lesser extent, the ORD. 
In addition to laying out mission scenarios that serve 
as a basis for IOTE, this chapter also identifies 
shortcomings in current documentation brought about by the 
Army’s migration to the Future Combat Systems, and 
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ultimately the Objective Force.  These shortcomings provide 
the basis for recommendations pertaining to developing the 
IOTE, presented in Chapter IV. 
 Each scenario includes a shaded operational 
effectiveness dendritic, depicting the level of opportunity 
to test and evaluate each MOP for the given scenario.  For 
example, in a scenario with limited numbers of targets, the 
opportunity to examine the Comanche’s ability to observe, 
acquire and prioritize targets will be limited.  As a 
result, that set of MOPs covering target acquisition and 
prioritization will be lightly shaded.  The dendritic’s 
legend details the levels associated with the degree of 
shading. No shading indicates that the MOP is not tested or 
evaluated in that particular scenario.   
 Execution matrices are located in Appendices A-D, to 
provide more detail to each mission scenario.  The 
execution matrices further depict the primary measures of 
performance available for test and evaluation in each 
scenario.  MOPs are tied to events that occur in conducting 
the mission as it is laid out in the mission description.  
Using the mission description, the execution matrix 
sequentially lays out the actions taken by the unit, and 
identifies the MOPs that should be tested and evaluated for 
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each segment of the mission.  An H-hour sequence is used to 
identify the time an event occurs in the mission.  H-hour 
alone indicates the start of the mission.  H-hour “+” an 
amount of time indicates the event occurs that many hours 
and/or minutes after the start of the mission.   
Most of the measures of performance, to a certain 
extent, are present in every mission the Comanche conducts.  
As an example, MOP 1-1-3-2: Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within Comanche equipped 
units, by radio type and mode, occurs in every tactical 
mission.  As a result, this particular MOP can be tested 
and evaluated every time two or more Comanches launch on a 
mission.  Therefore, to narrow the intent for each 
scenario, the testing focuses identified are those 
requirements or MOPs unique to, or best presented in that 
given mission.   
 
B. RECONNAISSANCE TO MOBILE STRIKE 
 
1. Mission   
 
Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) or Attack Helicopter Company 
(ATKHC), performs reconnaissance to locate, identify, and 
destroy (DID) Transport Erector Launchers (TELs) operating 
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within a 50x50 kilometer zone, 100 kilometers beyond FLOT, 
to deny enemies ability to interdict friendly staging 
operations.  Mission takes place during the hours of 
darkness. 
 
 2. Test Focus 
• Extended range, time on station, and payload 
capability. 
 
• BLOS/NLOS communication. 
• Off-board sensor employment. 
• In-direct engagements. 
• LO capabilities. 
• *Shipboard operations. 
 
 3. Mission Description. 
 
Intelligence sources report TELs, accompanied by Air 
Defense Artillery (ADA), departing motorpools towards 
firing positions, which can range the coalition Point of 
Debarkation (POD).  The division entering theater directs 
its assigned cavalry squadron the mission to conduct 
reconnaissance of a large zone in the enemy’s rear area, 
projected to be the most likely firing points for the TELs.   
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The squadron commander assigns the mission to one of his 
air cavalry troops to locate and destroy the TELs.  Besides 
the eight Comanche helicopters assigned, the troop will 
also have ATACMs in direct support.  Two UAVs are also 
placed on order, under the troop commander’s control to aid 
in the reconnaissance mission.  Initially the UAVs will fly 
predesignated tracks as part of the ACT’s reconnaissance 
plan, but can be retasked by the troop commander based upon 
mission needs during execution.  JSTAR feeds will also be 
employed to aid in locating the TELs. 
 The ACT will task organize into Scout Weapons Teams 
(SWTs) as necessary to accomplish the mission, based upon 
approved Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and 
aircraft availability.  Each aircraft will be configured 
with auxiliary fuel to provide extended time on station, 
as there will be no refueling capabilities pushed forward.  
During the mission they are continually alert for enemy 
counter-air aircraft and remain ready to engage in air 
combat if they are threatened.  Their weapons load is 
tailored for the mission and includes a mix of air-to-air 
missiles, antiarmor missiles, and cannon.  [Ref. 10] 
 *This mission could also be modified to 
initiate/terminate from/to shipboard as a precursor to 
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friendly forces entering a port of debarkation (POD) to 












































MOE 1-1-1: Ability of 
Comanche to conduct 
maneuver operations 
from locations about 
the battlefield during 
day and night, NBC 
conditions, adverse 
weather, battlespace 
obscurants, and high 
MOP 1-1-1-3: Success rate achieved by the 
Comanche’s  pilotage system(Fwd Looking 
Infrared and Image Intensifier) in providing 
crew members the ability to fly specified 
conditions and modes.
MOP 1-1-1-5:  Proportion of Comanche’s  
specified handling qualities successfully met.
MOP 1-1-1-2: Percentage of intended 
information successfully provided by  
Comanche’s digital map, mission planning 
station, target engagement, and  threat 
awareness for situational awareness. 
MOP 1-1-1-4:  Percentage of events 
successfully accomplished as a result of the 
Comanche’s crew station interface. (MFD, 
HIDSS CWA)
MOP 1-1-1-1: Percent of times Comanche 





















































  Criterion 1-1a: The 
Comanche equipped 




as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. MOP 1-1-2-5: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly identified by Comanche 
system out of the total number of targets 
detected. 
and hot environments
MOE 1-1-2:  ability of 
Comanche to 
observe and acquire 
and prioritize targets 
in various conditions 
on the battlefield. 
MOP 1-1-2-4: Proportion of ground and air  
targets correctly recognized by Comanche 
out of the total number of targets detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-7: Distribution of the number of 
false targets and false detection’s by 
Comanche crew members.
MOP 1-1-1-6: Proportion of Comanche‘s 
specified  performance qualities successfully 
met. 
MOP 1-1-2-6: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly prioritized by Comanche 
system out of the total  number of targets 
detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-1: Time Comanche takes to 
detect, classify, recognize, identify, prioritize 
targets. 
MOP 1-1-2-2: Proportion of ground and air 
targets detected by Comanche aircraft out of 
the total number of operationally important 
targets
MOP 1-1-2-3: Proportion of ground  and air 
targets correctly classified by Comanche 
aircraft out of the total number of targets 






ns? Criterion 1-1b:The 
Comanche equipped 




defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. Average Extensive 




















































MOP 1-1-3-7: Proportion of synthesizing off-
board sensor information into Comanche 
MEP during flight operations.
MOP 1-1-3-6: Proportion of successful 
employment of off-board sensors. 
MOP 1-1-4-8: Proportion of engagements 
where by laser designation/range finder 
provided required information. (Range, 
boresight retention, designation, & 
divergence). 
MOP 1-1-4-7:  Proportion of engagements 
whereby the sighting system provided 
required information. (Tracking of targets, 
locating targets, & pre-point operations.) 
MOP 1-1-4-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to engage 
threat systems. 
MOP 1-1-4-2:  Distribution of the number of 
targets hit by Comanche helicopter teams 
against threat forces (Gunnery Phase). 
MOP 1-1-4-3: Operational proportion of 
successful Comanche Team engagements. 
MOP 1-1-4-6:   Proportion of successful 
coordinated Joint engagements against 
operationally significant targets.
MOP 1-1-4-5:   Proportion of successful 
synchronized Combined Arms Team 
engagements against operationally 
significant targets
MOP 1-1-4-4:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to handover 
target data.
MOP 1-1-3-4: Proportion of successful voice 
communications external to Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure).
MOP 1-1-3-5:  Proportion of successful digital 
communications external Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-3-3:  Proportion of successful 
tactical digital communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).   
MOP 1-1-3-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to tactically 
communicate battlefield information. 
MOP 1-1-3-2:  Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).
MOE 1-1-4: the 
ability of the 
Comanche crew to 
develop the situation, 
defend itself and 
attack using its own 
or other weapon 
systems.
MOE 1-1-3:  ability of 
the Comanche crew 




Criterion 1-1c:  The 
Comanche equipped 
unit must meet the 
Commanders Attack 
Mission requirements 
as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 












































Figure 5.  MOP Coverage for Reconnaissance to Mobile Strike  
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4. Mission Summary 
 
 This scenario, more than any other, stresses the 
Comanche’s ability to meet its flying speed, auxiliary 
fuel, BLOS/NLOS communication, Low Observability (LO) and 
off-board sensor integration. Although almost all MOPs can 
be tested and evaluated, the limited number of targets will 
not stress the Comanche’s ability to observe, acquire and 
prioritize targets in various battlefield conditions to the 
extent of other scenarios.  Likewise, the Comanche’s 
ability to communicate with external organizations is 
tested to a limited extent.  This scenario does not examine 
air-ground interoperability. 
 




ACT conducts movement to contact as part of a heavy 
divisional cavalry squadron, In Order To (IOT) gain contact 
and destroy enemy forces as part of an integrated air-
ground team.  The squadron must halt enemy forces at a 
distance outside of their artillery’s ability to range the 
POD. 
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2. Test Focus 
• Interoperability with ground forces. 
• Provide extended target acquisition ranges. 
• Detect, Identify, Affiliate and Engage Targets. 
• Sharing COP with ground forces. 
• Employing indirect fires from joint assets. 
 
3. Mission Description 
 
As friendly forces continue to build combat power, the 
first division on the ground begins to push out the 
perimeter to gain reaction time and maneuver space.  Enemy 
forces are pushing forward to destroy friendly units, and 
deny their use of port facilities to continue the buildup.  
As a result, the friendly commander assigns the divisional 
cavalry squadron the mission to conduct a movement to 
contact to halt the approaching enemy forces as far from 
the port of entry as possible. 
The cavalry squadron executes the line of departure 
(LD) with one ACT, and two Ground Cavalry Troops (GCT) 
forward.  The ACT bounds forward, staying one (PL) ahead of 
the GCTs, providing early warning of enemy forces.  This 
allows the GCTs to rapidly maneuver forward in traveling 
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overwatch formation.  JSTARS and UAVs also provide the 
squadron intelligence on the enemy’s movement, enhancing 
situational awareness and lessening the likelihood of 
unexpected contact.   
As the two forces converge, the ACT destroys the 
enemy’s reconnaissance assets and provides the GCTs 
intelligence as they deploy to begin engaging.  As the GCT 
begins direct fire engagements, the ACT takes up overwatch 
positions on the squadron’s flanks to provide security and 
shift its reconnaissance focus deeper for follow on forces.  
The ACT engages high priority targets with direct fires, 
and utilizes indirect fires to harass incoming enemy forces 
to disrupt and fragment their formations.  This disruption 
precludes the enemy massing on the GCTs, allowing them to 
engage and destroy targets piecemeal.   
The ACT will configure the SWTs with primarily 
hellfire and 20mm ordnance, but also arm selected aircraft 
with stingers to provide protection against enemy aircraft.  
Once enemy contact is made, the ACT will also conduct JAAT 
operations to destroy enemy forces.  
This scenario ends with the enemy going to ground, 
establishing a hasty defense behind the positions where the 
cavalry squadron destroyed his leading battalions.  The 
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division’s Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) followed the 
squadron’s advance and have also set up defensive 
positions, keeping friendly forces beyond enemy artillery 









































MOP 1-1-2-5: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly identified by Comanche 
system out of the total number of targets 
detected. 
MOE 1-1-1: Ability of 
Comanche to conduct 
maneuver operations 
from locations about 
the battlefield during 
day and night, NBC 
conditions, adverse 
weather, battlespace 
obscurants, and high 
and hot environments
MOE 1-1-2:  ability of 
Comanche to 
observe and acquire 
and prioritize targets 
in various conditions 
on the battlefield. 
MOP 1-1-2-4: Proportion of ground and air  
targets correctly recognized by Comanche 
out of the total number of targets detected. 
MOP 1-1-1-3: Success rate achieved by the 
Comanche’s  pilotage system(Fwd Looking 
Infrared and Image Intensifier) in providing 
crew members the ability to fly specified 
conditions and modes.
MOP 1-1-2-7: Distribution of the number of 
false targets and false detection’s by 
Comanche crew members.
MOP 1-1-1-6: Proportion of Comanche‘s 
specified  performance qualities successfully 
met. 
MOP 1-1-2-6: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly prioritized by Comanche 
system out of the total  number of targets 
detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-1: Time Comanche takes to 
detect, classify, recognize, identify, prioritize 
targets. 
MOP 1-1-2-3: Proportion of ground  and air 
targets correctly classified by Comanche 
aircraft out of the total number of targets 
MOP 1-1-2-2: Proportion of ground and air 
targets detected by Comanche aircraft out of 
the total number of operationally important 
targets
MOP 1-1-1-5:  Proportion of Comanche’s  
specified handling qualities successfully met.
MOP 1-1-1-2: Percentage of intended 
information successfully provided by  
Comanche’s digital map, mission planning 
station, target engagement, and  threat 
awareness for situational awareness. 
MOP 1-1-1-4:  Percentage of events 
successfully accomplished as a result of the 
Comanche’s crew station interface. (MFD, 
HIDSS CWA)
MOP 1-1-1-1: Percent of times Comanche 








defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. 
Criterion 1-1a: The 
Comanche equipped 




as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 

















































































































































Figure 7.  MOP Coverage for Close Combat with Ground Forces cont. 
MOP 1-1-3-7: Proportion of synthesizing off-
board sensor information into Comanche 
MEP during flight operations. 
MOP 1-1-3-6: Proportion of successful 
employment of off-board sensors. 
MOP 1-1-4-8: Proportion of engagements 
where by laser designation/range finder 
provided required information. (Range, 
boresight retention, designation, & 
divergence). 
MOP 1-1-4-7:  Proportion of engagements 
whereby the sighting system provided 
required information. (Tracking of targets, 
locating targets, & pre-point operations.) 
MOP 1-1-4-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to engage 
threat systems. 
MOP 1-1-4-2:  Distribution of the number of 
targets hit by Comanche helicopter teams 
against threat forces (Gunnery Phase). 
MOP 1-1-4-3: Operational proportion of 
successful Comanche Team engagements. 
MOP 1-1-4-6:   Proportion of successful 
coordinated Joint engagements against 
operationally significant targets.
MOP 1-1-4-5:   Proportion of successful 
synchronized Combined Arms Team 
engagements against operationally 
significant targets
MOP 1-1-4-4:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to handover 
target data. 
MOP 1-1-3-4: Proportion of successful voice 
communications external to Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure).
MOP 1-1-3-5:  Proportion of successful digital 
communications external Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-3-3:  Proportion of successful 
tactical digital communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).   
MOP 1-1-3-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to tactically 
communicate battlefield information. 
MOP 1-1-3-2:  Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).
MOE 1-1-4: the 
ability of the 
Comanche crew to 
develop the situation, 
defend itself and 
attack using its own 
or other weapon 
systems.
MOE 1-1-3:  ability of 
the Comanche crew 
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 4. Mission Summary 
  
This scenario focuses on air-ground interoperability.  
Maintaining situational awareness during rapid joint air-
ground maneuver, especially with heavy enemy contact, is 
extremely difficult.  The Comanche MEP must assimilate and 
share necessary information between all team members, 
helping to build an accurate common operating picture.  
Accurate information sharing becomes more critical as SWTs 
rotate into and out of the FARP.  Total situational 
awareness must be maintained to prevent loss of aircraft, 
or loss of enemy contact. Comanche sensors must detect, 
identify and destroy enemy forces at extended ranges.  
 




Light Attack Company conducts a deep attack during the 
hours of darkness to destroy an enemy armor battalion 
marshalling to go on the attack.  The enemy’s objective is 
to take the port facility to deny friendly forces the 
ability to continue to build combat power. 
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 2. Test Focus  
• Extended range, time on station, and payload 
capability. 
 
• LO capability. 
• BLOS/NLOS communication. 
• Off-board sensor employment. 
• Direct fire engagements. 
• In-direct fire engagements. 
 
3. Mission Description 
 
After the enemy’s initial attack failed to take the 
port facility, he has established defensive positions and 
is gathering his own combat power to conduct a larger 
attack.  His goal is to overmatch friendly combat power on 
the ground, seize the port facility, and disallow our 
ability to continue to build forces.   
The center of gravity for the enemy attacking force is 
an armor brigade marshalling behind his defensive 
positions.  There is currently one battalion in place, with 
the remainder of the brigade expected to form within the 
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next 36 hours.  The battalion is protected from air attack 
by an air defense artillery battery.  
To destroy the enemy’s center of gravity, and preempt 
his attack, the friendly division assigns one of its Light 
Attack Companies a deep attack mission against the building 
armor forces.  The attack is planned to occur during the 
hours of darkness, with the company cycling through a 
Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) in order to 
engage the targets twice.  The company will fly a planned 
route into battle positions, from which they will engage 
and destroy as many enemy vehicles as possible.  After the 
company expends all their ordnance, the unit will egress 
the area to a FARP, rearm and refuel, then fly to other 
assigned battle positions to continue the attack.  After 
the company expends all ordnance the second time, or has no 
further targets to engage, they return to base to prepare 
for future operations. 
To support the attack, the division again employs UAVs 
and JSTARS to maintain contact with enemy forces.  Limited 
ATACMs will also be used to provide Suppression of Enemy 












































Average Extensive Limited 
MOP 1-1-2-5: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly identified by Comanche 
system out of the total number of targets 
detected. 
MOE 1-1-1: Ability of 
Comanche to conduct 
maneuver operations 
from locations about 
the battlefield during 
day and night, NBC 
conditions, adverse 
weather, battlespace 
obscurants, and high 
and hot environments
MOE 1-1-2:  ability of 
Comanche to 
observe and acquire 
and prioritize targets 
in various conditions 
on the battlefield. 
MOP 1-1-2-4: Proportion of ground and air  
targets correctly recognized by Comanche 
out of the total number of targets detected. 
MOP 1-1-1-3: Success rate achieved by the 
Comanche’s  pilotage system(Fwd Looking 
Infrared and Image Intensifier) in providing 
crew members the ability to fly specified 
conditions and modes.
MOP 1-1-2-7: Distribution of the number of 
false targets and false detection’s by 
Comanche crew members.
MOP 1-1-1-6: Proportion of Comanche‘s 
specified  performance qualities successfully 
met. 
MOP 1-1-2-6: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly prioritized by Comanche 
system out of the total  number of targets 
detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-1: Time Comanche takes to 
detect, classify, recognize, identify, prioritize 
targets. 
MOP 1-1-2-2: Proportion of ground and air 
targets detected by Comanche aircraft out of 
the total number of operationally important 
targets
MOP 1-1-2-3: Proportion of ground  and air 
targets correctly classified by Comanche 
aircraft out of the total number of targets 
MOP 1-1-1-5:  Proportion of Comanche’s  
specified handling qualities successfully met.
MOP 1-1-1-2: Percentage of intended 
information successfully provided by  
Comanche’s digital map, mission planning 
station, target engagement, and  threat 
awareness for situational awareness. 
MOP 1-1-1-4:  Percentage of events 
successfully accomplished as a result of the 
Comanche’s crew station interface. (MFD, 
HIDSS CWA)
MOP 1-1-1-1: Percent of times Comanche 
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mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 
better than the 
baseline equipped 
unit. 
Criterion 1-1a: The 
Comanche equipped 
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Figure 9.  MOP Coverage for Mobile Strike cont. 
MOP 1-1-3-7: Proportion of synthesizing off-
board sensor information into Comanche 
MEP during flight operations. 
MOP 1-1-3-6: Proportion of successful 
employment of off-board sensors. 
MOP 1-1-4-8: Proportion of engagements 
where by laser designation/range finder 
provided required information. (Range, 
boresight retention, designation, & 
divergence). 
MOP 1-1-4-7:  Proportion of engagements 
whereby the sighting system provided 
required information. (Tracking of targets, 
locating targets, & pre-point operations.) 
MOP 1-1-4-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to engage 
threat systems. 
MOP 1-1-4-2:  Distribution of the number of 
targets hit by Comanche helicopter teams 
against threat forces (Gunnery Phase). 
MOP 1-1-4-3: Operational proportion of 
successful Comanche Team engagements. 
MOP 1-1-4-6:   Proportion of successful 
coordinated Joint engagements against 
operationally significant targets.
MOP 1-1-4-5:   Proportion of successful 
synchronized Combined Arms Team 
engagements against operationally 
significant targets
MOP 1-1-4-4:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to handover 
target data. 
MOP 1-1-3-4: Proportion of successful voice 
communications external to Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure).
MOP 1-1-3-5:  Proportion of successful digital 
communications external Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-3-3:  Proportion of successful 
tactical digital communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).   
MOP 1-1-3-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to tactically 
communicate battlefield information. 
MOP 1-1-3-2:  Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).
MOE 1-1-4: the 
ability of the 
Comanche crew to 
develop the situation, 
defend itself and 
attack using its own 
or other weapon 
systems.
MOE 1-1-3:  ability of 
the Comanche crew 




Criterion 1-1c:  The 
Comanche equipped 
unit must meet the 
Commanders Attack 
Mission requirements 
as defined by the 
mission profiles 
outlined in the 
OMS/MP and perform 






4. Mission Summary 
 
This scenario focuses on the Comanche’s lethality in a 
target rich environment.  Utilizing its advanced systems, 
the aircraft should be able to quickly maneuver to a firing 
position, scan for targets, prioritize, and then assign 
targets to the entire team of Comanches.  Engagements 
should be quick and deadly, with all aircraft firing near 
simultaneously. This scenario also tests the aircrafts 
ability to not only discern different types of vehicles 
through heavy obscurants, but also its ability to verify 
BDA. 
 




The division’s cavalry squadron, as part of the 
division’s attack, assumes blocking positions beyond the 
division’s objective, to prevent enemy reinforcements from 





2. Test Focus 
• Sharing COP with all members of the air ground 
team. 
 
• Capability to retask sensors. 
• Provide extended target acquisition ranges. 
• Detect, Identify, Affiliate and Engage Targets.  
• Synchronize joint and organic fires. 
 
3. Mission Description 
 
After losing the majority of an armor battalion to the 
deep attack, the enemy postpones his attack, and continues 
to reposition forces in an effort to build sufficient 
combat power to attack.  Friendly forces also continue to 
build, with all the division’s BCTs on the ground, and its 
logistics support offloading in the POD.   
The division conducts an attack to seize the 
initiative, expand the division’s footprint, and continue 
to disrupt the expected enemy attack.  The division’s 
objective is key terrain, twenty kilometers behind the 
FLOT.  The attack initiates in the hours of darkness with a 
Comanche equipped attack company moving forward to engage 
and destroy the enemy’s Regimental Artillery Group (RAG), 
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using both joint and organic fires.  Shortly thereafter, 
one of the BCTs moves forward to breach the enemy’s 
defenses.  First through the breach will be a second BCT, 
which will maneuver to engage the enemy’s reserve forces, 
allowing the division’s cavalry squadron to maneuver 
unhindered through the breach, and continue to positions 
beyond the objective, blocking expected reinforcements.  
The squadron will maneuver with an air cavalry platoon 
forward, conducting reconnaissance, allowing the GCTs to 
race to their blocking positions.  The second air cavalry 
platoon launches as needed to relieve the platoon forward. 
Once the squadron is established in its blocking 
positions, the ACT will screen forward, providing early 
warning.  Based upon the situation, the squadron will 
conduct a rearward passage of lines, through the BCTs 
consolidated on the objective, or conduct a relief in 
place.  As with all the other scenarios, the ACT will plug 
into all the joint assets providing battlefield 











































Average Extensive Limited 
MOP 1-1-2-5: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly identified by Comanche 
system out of the total number of targets 
detected. 
MOE 1-1-1: Ability of 
Comanche to conduct 
maneuver operations 
from locations about 
the battlefield during 
day and night, NBC 
conditions, adverse 
weather, battlespace 
obscurants, and high 
and hot environments
MOE 1-1-2:  ability of 
Comanche to 
observe and acquire 
and prioritize targets 
in various conditions 
on the battlefield. 
MOP 1-1-2-4: Proportion of ground and air  
targets correctly recognized by Comanche 
out of the total number of targets detected. 
MOP 1-1-1-3: Success rate achieved by the 
Comanche’s  pilotage system(Fwd Looking 
Infrared and Image Intensifier) in providing 
crew members the ability to fly specified 
conditions and modes.
MOP 1-1-2-7: Distribution of the number of 
false targets and false detection’s by 
Comanche crew members.
MOP 1-1-1-6: Proportion of Comanche‘s 
specified  performance qualities successfully 
met. 
MOP 1-1-2-6: Proportion of ground and air 
targets correctly prioritized by Comanche 
system out of the total  number of targets 
detected. 
MOP 1-1-2-1: Time Comanche takes to 
detect, classify, recognize, identify, prioritize 
targets. 
MOP 1-1-2-2: Proportion of ground and air 
targets detected by Comanche aircraft out of 
the total number of operationally important 
targets
MOP 1-1-2-3: Proportion of ground  and air 
targets correctly classified by Comanche 
aircraft out of the total number of targets 
MOP 1-1-1-5:  Proportion of Comanche’s  
specified handling qualities successfully met.
MOP 1-1-1-2: Percentage of intended 
information successfully provided by  
Comanche’s digital map, mission planning 
station, target engagement, and  threat 
awareness for situational awareness. 
MOP 1-1-1-4:  Percentage of events 
successfully accomplished as a result of the 
Comanche’s crew station interface. (MFD, 
HIDSS CWA)
MOP 1-1-1-1: Percent of times Comanche 
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Figure 11.  MOP Coverage for Multi-Modal Operational Maneuver cont. 
MOP 1-1-3-7: Proportion of synthesizing off-
board sensor information into Comanche 
MEP during flight operations. 
MOP 1-1-3-6: Proportion of successful 
employment of off-board sensors. 
MOP 1-1-4-8: Proportion of engagements 
where by laser designation/range finder 
provided required information. (Range, 
boresight retention, designation, & 
divergence). 
MOP 1-1-4-7:  Proportion of engagements 
whereby the sighting system provided 
required information. (Tracking of targets, 
locating targets, & pre-point operations.) 
MOP 1-1-4-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to engage 
threat systems. 
MOP 1-1-4-2:  Distribution of the number of 
targets hit by Comanche helicopter teams 
against threat forces (Gunnery Phase). 
MOP 1-1-4-3: Operational proportion of 
successful Comanche Team engagements. 
MOP 1-1-4-6:   Proportion of successful 
coordinated Joint engagements against 
operationally significant targets.
MOP 1-1-4-5:   Proportion of successful 
synchronized Combined Arms Team 
engagements against operationally 
significant targets
MOP 1-1-4-4:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to handover 
target data. 
MOP 1-1-3-4: Proportion of successful voice 
communications external to Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure).
MOP 1-1-3-5:  Proportion of successful digital 
communications external Comanche 
equipped units, by radio type and mode 
(secure/non-secure). 
MOP 1-1-3-3:  Proportion of successful 
tactical digital communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).   
MOP 1-1-3-1:  Distribution of action times 
(duration) of Comanche aircraft to tactically 
communicate battlefield information. 
MOP 1-1-3-2:  Proportion of successful 
tactical voice communications within 
Comanche equipped units, by radio type and 
mode (secure/non-secure).
MOE 1-1-4: the 
ability of the 
Comanche crew to 
develop the situation, 
defend itself and 
attack using its own 
or other weapon 
systems.
MOE 1-1-3:  ability of 
the Comanche crew 
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Comanche equipped 
unit must meet the 
Commanders Attack 
Mission requirements 
as defined by the 
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outlined in the 
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4. Mission Summary 
 
This scenario tests the Comanche’s ability to work 
with several different maneuver units operating in close 
proximity on the battlefield.  The aircraft must be able to 
differentiate between friendly organizational, non-
organizational and enemy vehicles. The common operating 
picture must be accurate enough to allow the squadron’s 
aircraft to be given a new mission, with another ground 
element, without having to spend an inordinate amount of 
time on the radio or conducting a face-to-face meeting to 
gain situational awareness.  Further, as teams rotate to 
and from the FARP, the Comanche’s systems must develop and 
sustain a common operating picture that allows quick 




 The author’s scenarios presented in this chapter, 
reconnaissance to mobile strike, close combat with ground 
forces, mobile strike, and multi-modal operational maneuver 
serve as a basis for the Comanche IOTE.  These missions, as 
part of the aviation CONOPs, examine the Comanche’s ability 
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to meet the Army’s requirements of its future aircraft.  
Each scenario, to varying degrees, address almost all of 
the MOPs detailed in the operational effectiveness 
dendritic.  However, each scenario is uniquely fashioned to 
focus on specific requirements, testing to what degree the 
Comanche is able to perform those requirements that serve 
as the focus of the particular scenario.  Chapter IV 
identifies each scenario’s focal requirements, and 



















IOTE is a critical step in the acquisition process.  
It is the first time users get to employ the equipment, 
ensuring it will meet their needs in the conditions that 
they operate.  Bench tests and successes in the rigidly 
controlled environment of the lab must be proven in the 
chaotic realm of the war fighter.  To effectively prove the 
tested equipment meets the ultimate requirements set forth 
by the users, the IOTE must be fashioned as realistically 
as possible to mimic the rigorous demands of battle. 
The purpose of IOTE is spelled out in several 
references.  However, the method to conduct the actual 
event is not so neatly delineated.  While the general 
principles for IOTE are the same for every test, each test 
is uniquely different from the next.  Many factors must be 
considered when developing the IOTE, much more than the 
basic who, what, why, when and where.  Chief among 
considerations when developing the IOTE is funding, 
especially because the event is extremely expensive.  The 
money available to conduct the test and evaluation 
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determines what, and to what extent, different functions or 
capabilities of the equipment in question will be tested.  
With a funding limitation, test developers must determine 
the most critical functions or capabilities to test.  
Therefore, the scenarios presented in Chapter III focus on 
the areas the researcher deems most important, in terms of 
mission capabilities that the Comanche must possess.  
Increased capabilities that the Comanche must possess are 
extended range and station times, superior sensor suites, 
increased maneuverability and speed, and increased 
survivability.  Just as critical, the Comanche must possess 
integrated communications system to share the information 
it collects across the entire spectrum of joint operators.  
Integral to sharing information, the Comanche’s systems 
must aid the crew in synthesizing the common operating 
picture required to successfully operate on the fluid and 
dynamic battlefield of the future.   
This chapter will first identify those areas in which 
the scenarios overlap, drawing out those MOPs and 
capabilities that are present to test in every scenario.  
Following this, the scenarios will be analyzed individually 
to elicit the specific capabilities the scenario was 
crafted to showcase.  The final analysis of the scenarios 
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identifies means to conduct the Comanche IOTE if funding 
limits the number of missions able to be run.  The chapter 
concludes by identifying items that need to be addressed in 
Follow On Test and Evaluation (FOTE). 
 
B. COMMON TEST OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS 
  
 Many of the scenarios presented in Chapter III share a 
number of common testing foci, in terms of capabilities 
that the Comanche must perform.  The scenarios are not 
redundant however.  The scenarios test the aircraft's 
capabilities to different degrees.  For instance, the first 
scenario tests BLOS/NLOS communications at a greater 
distance than the third scenario.  Both scenarios require 
vast improvements in communications existent in helicopters 
currently fielded, but the first scenario requires it 100 
kilometers further than scenario three.  These scenarios 
then will test the degree to which BLOS/NLOS communications 
work at varying distances.  Communications tested include 
both voice and digital, between several different systems.  
 In reviewing the shaded dendritics in Chapter III, it 
quickly becomes apparent that almost all the MOPs 
associated with operational effectiveness are present in 
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all the scenarios to varying degrees.  Similarly to the 
testing focus described in the previous paragraph, the 
scenarios are designed to stress those MOPs most prevalent 
in the given scenario.  Testers and evaluators can choose 
to gather data on all possible MOPs in every scenario, or 
gather data when the MOPs are most stressed by a scenario.  
Section C details the critical capabilities that each 
scenario was designed specifically to evaluate, though many 
of these MOPs and capabilities exist in other scenarios as 
well. 
  
C. UNIQUE TEST OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS  
 
1. Reconnaissance to Mobile Strike 
 
This scenario requires the Comanche to prove its 
ability to travel extended distances undetected, maintain 
ample station time to conduct thorough reconnaissance, and 
utilize its BLOS/NLOS communication capability to relay 
information over extended distances.  This scenario also 
integrates off-board sensors to a greater extent than any 
other mission scenario. 
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Of the four scenarios, this is the only one that 
requires the Comanche to employ its auxiliary fuel 
requirement.  The aircraft must be reconfigurable to 
provide extra station time without significant degradation 
in its LO capability.  Iddeally, adding the extra fuel will 
not make the aircraft more susceptible to detection by 
radar or IR systems.  Traveling deep into enemy territory, 
through numerous Air Defense system’s acquisition 
envelopes, and then conducting reconnaissance of a large 
area, provides testers and evaluators the opportunity to 
examine both of these capabilities.   
Also crucial to success in this scenario is the 
aircraft’s ability to utilize off-board sensors such as 
JSTARS and UAVs.  To adequately conduct reconnaissance of a 
50X50 kilometer zone, with the time constraint of one fuel 
load, requires the full integration of all sensors 
available.  If aircraft casualties occur during the conduct 
of this mission, off-board sensors become even more 
important.   
 The following critical capabilities are most stressed 
in this scenario, compared to the other four: 
 Auxiliary fuel. 
 Off-board sensor employment/integration. 
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 BLOS/NLOS communications. 
 
2. Close Combat with Ground Forces 
 
The focus for this scenario is to test the Comanche’s 
ability to interoperate with and enhance the air-ground 
team.  Rotary wing aircraft have long been valuable assets 
in conducting air-ground operations, including 
reconnaissance, attack, and command and control.  The 
Comanche must prove to conduct these missions substantially 
better than aircraft currently in use.  The primary 
enhancements Comanche potentially makes to the air-ground 
team is its superior ability to acquire information, share 
that information throughout the team, and destroy threats 
more efficiently. 
The Comanche must acquire targets at greater 
distances, and be able to share that information more 
quickly, over greater distances than current practice.  
More simply, provide ground forces complete threat 
information, earlier.  This allows the ground maneuver 
commander more time to evaluate the reported information, 
formulate a plan, and put the plan into action.  All of 
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this translates into better decisions and a greater chance 
for success.   
Also important as an air-ground team member is the 
ability to destroy threats.  To destroy threats, systems 
must first be able to acquire them.  As discussed already 
in the reconnaissance scenario, the Comanche’s greater 
ability to detect threats improves its ability to be more 
lethal.  Couple this with enhanced weaponry, and the 
Comanche will be more lethal than any aircraft fielded to 
date. 
BLOS/NLOS communication plays a crucial role in both 
of these requirements.  The ability to pass information 
over greater distances equates to more time on the 
battlefield to make decisions.  The earlier threats are 
detected and reported, the earlier the force commander 
begins his planning and execution process.  As well, the 
ability to talk over greater distances makes the Comanche 
more lethal.  Previously, aircraft were limited in their 
ability to engage targets with indirect fires because of 
the lack of range in the aircraft’s communications systems.  
With BLOS/NLOS communications, Comanche equipped units can 
call for and adjust fires up to the range limitation of the 
firing system, not communication system. 
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The following critical capability is most stressed in 
this scenario: 
• Air-ground interoperability 
 
3. Mobile Strike 
 
This scenario focuses on the Comanche’s lethality, 
primarily using direct fire.  By isolating a company of 
Comanches against a target set, testers and evaluators can 
accurately gauge the success of the aircraft in acquiring, 
prioritizing and destroying targets.  Prioritization is 
key, as the aircraft’s weapons system has been designed to 
prioritize targets, taking people initially out of the 
loop.  The operator can override all systems, but this 
obviously defeats the benefit of having a computer 
accomplish prioritization more quickly.  Another benefit of 
the computer is the elimination of human error.  
The lethality focus of this scenario overlaps with 
live fire testing.  However, the operational context of the 
scenario extends beyond where live fire testing ends.  The 
live fire test (LFT) does not focus on the operational 
employment of the aircraft.  Rather, the LFT focuses more 
on the aircraft hitting and destroying its intended target.  
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Although the LFT can be made to mimic an operational 
engagement, firing ranges by their very nature make 
operational employment using correct TTP difficult.  Safety 
requirements of the range many times prohibit realistic 
employment of aircraft weapons systems.  However, using the 
aircraft’s training devices, in concert with test 
instrumentation, all the tasks associated with actually 
shooting live ordnance can be accurately accomplished in a 
testing or training scenario.  Through the use of 
instrumented targetry and aircraft, testers and evaluators 
(T&E) can realistically determine if the firing aircraft 
hit what it shot at.  These results, coupled with the LFT 
results, allow the T&E community to extrapolate the lethal 
effectiveness of the aircraft in a true operational 
setting. 
This scenario also overlaps with scenario one to a 
limited extent.  Both of the scenarios require the Comanche 
to maneuver deep beyond the FLOT, communicate via BLOS/NLOS 
means, and integrate off-board sensors.  The difference 
lies in the degrees these three capabilities are exercised.  
It has already been established that scenario one was 
specifically designed to stress these three capabilities.  
Therefore, the major difference for this scenario is the 
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plethora of targets that the Comanche must destroy as part 
of a deep mobile strike. 
The company of Comanches will first be required to 
maneuver quickly, and preferably undetected to Attack By 
Fire (ABF) positions from which to engage the enemy 
vehicles.  Where the first scenario required auxiliary fuel 
to accomplish the mission, this scenario requires 
additional ordnance.  Each aircraft will be armed with 16 
hellfires and 500 rounds of 20mm, as described in the Light 
Division, Close Operation – Southwest Asia mission profile 
of the OPMODSUM [Ref. 10].  (If the test aircraft do not 
have the capability to mount 16 hellfires, the test will be 
conducted with the full complement of hellfires the test 
aircraft can employ.) 
Once the aircraft have reached the ABFs, the 
designated aircraft(s) scan for targets.  After acquiring 
the targets, the aircraft must correctly identify and 
prioritize them.  The aircraft must then assign its sister 
aircraft targets.  Once all parameters are verified, the 
company engages targets until expending all ordnance, or 
destroying all detected targets.  Once either of these two 
parameters has been met, the company egresses to a 
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designated FARP to refuel and rearm, in preparation to 
conduct another rotation to the target area.  
 Enroute to the FARP, the company must accurately 
accumulate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and report that 
to headquarters.  Likewise, UAVs will be used to assess 
BDA, and also provide information to the company, providing 
situational awareness as they prepare to again enter zone 
to conduct another attack.  The second attack will follow 
the same outline as the first attack. 
 The following critical capability is most stressed in 
this scenario: 
• Target acquisition, prioritization, and 
engagements. 
 
4. Multi-Modal Operational Maneuver 
 
This scenario tests the ability of the Comanche to 
synthesize all the information received from the myriad of 
systems throughout the battlefield, into an accurate and 
total common operating picture.  Further, this COP must be 
easily intelligible to the crew.  The level of situational 
awareness required by the cavalry, especially its air 
troops, is unmatched.  It is not uncommon for the squadron 
to switch controlling headquarters from the division to one 
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of its BCTs in the midst of battle, sometimes changing 
missions at the same time.  This shift on the fly requires 
complete situational awareness, as to friendly and enemy 
locations, and common graphic control measures from which 
to operate.   
As part of the Comanche operating systems, common 
graphics and fragmentary orders (FRAGO) can be disseminated 
to the entire troop in seconds.  These systems will also 
illustrate the locations of friendly and enemy units.  With 
this information, an air troop can quickly re-orient and 
begin execution.  If the Comanche performs as expected, 
what used to take either long and detailed radio 
communications, or face-to-face meetings, can now be 
accomplished with fewer errors, very quickly. 
Requiring the air troop to maneuver, staying tied into 
other units outside of the squadron tests the Comanches 
ability to build and display an intelligible COP.  Issuing 
the troop a FRAGO, requiring it to accomplish a new mission 
under the control of another headquarters, further tests 
this capability.   
This scenario presents a unique challenge.  It is 
unrealistic and cost prohibitive to include two BCTs in 
IOTE.  Simulation will be required to portray the BCTs to 
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the applicable Comanche systems, providing the crews 
accurate information to properly conduct the scenario. 
 The following critical capability is most stressed in 
this scenario: 
• Building and sharing a common operating 
picture. 
 
D. METHODS TO MAXIMIZE LIMITED RESOURCES 
 
1. Combined Scenarios 
 
Analysis shows that the scenarios test many of the 
same MOPs and capabilities, albeit to different degrees. 
This fact then leads to opportunities to garner 
effectiveness and efficiency tradeoffs, especially in the 
event insufficient resources are allocated for all four 
scenarios.  A combination of scenarios can be used to 
provide evaluation data.  This combination will not provide 
the breadth of data afforded by all four scenarios, but 
will provide sufficient data on which to base an IOTE 
decision.  The lack of data will lead to lower confidence 
levels on which to base quantitative decisions, but not the 
ability of testers, evaluators and users to determine how 
well the aircraft accomplished its mission.  Therefore, to 
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be able to determine if the Comanche performed to the 
required standard, the combined scenarios must be fashioned 
to put the aircraft in as many, if not all, the situations 
which the aircraft must accomplish when fielded. 
The optimal solution is to combine the scenarios in 
such a way as to maximize the information gathered, while 
minimizing costs and schedule requirements.  To accomplish 
this, test formulators must evaluate the marginal gains of 
an event compared to its cost.  To illustrate, two of the 
scenarios require BLOS/NLOS communications.  One scenario 
requires this capability beyond 150 kilometers, the other 
beyond 100 kilometers.  Based upon knowledge of 
communications systems, and results of Developmental Tests 
(DT), testers and evaluators can extrapolate with a high 
degree of confidence that the communications systems will 
work at all ranges up to the range exhibited in the 150 
kilometers scenario. 
 When combining scenarios, all the critical 
capabilities must be tested and evaluated.  The scenarios 
that should be combined are those that share the most 
MOPs/capabilities tested.  As the scenarios have been laid 
out by the author in Chapter III, the four can be combined 
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into two, while still testing and evaluating all the 
critical capabilities the Comanche must possess.   
 The first amalgamation would combine scenarios one and 
three, with some modifications.  The new scenario would be 
modified into a deep mobile strike, which would require the 
Comanche unit to fly 200 kilometers to reach their ABFs.  
The targets would remain the armor battalion from the 
original scenario three mobile strike.  This modification 
would still require the Comanche to demonstrate its 
auxiliary fuel, BLOS/NLOS communication, and off-board 
sensor integration from the first scenario.  Including the 
target set from scenario three enables testers and 
evaluators to examine the critical capability from that 
scenario, which was to examine the Comanches ability to 
acquire, prioritize and destroy targets. 
 This leaves scenarios two and four to be combined.  
This combination would also require some modifications to 
the scenarios.  The ACT conducts the close combat with 
ground forces as described in scenario two, with the 
division’s other units being simulated and fed into the 
Comanche’s systems.  Once the squadron’s GCTs have 
destroyed/halted the enemy, the ACTs would receive a FRAGO 
to conduct the attack described in scenario four.  This 
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combined scenario tests the critical capabilities of 
interoperability with ground forces, and building/sharing 
the COP. 
 The disadvantage of combining scenarios is less data 
gathered to evaluate.  Even if the scenarios are combined 
without losing any operational reality, the aircraft will 
still fly less, and generate less test data.  Whereas the 
key operational efffectiveness MOPs may be tested 
sufficiently in fewer hours, the sustainability MOPs most 
likely will not be.  Many of the sustainability MOPs 
require adequate flight hours to evaluate the durability 
and integrity of aircraft components, ensuring the aircraft 
meets its Operational Readiness requirements. 
Regardless of which requirements are affected more by 
less flying and thereby less testing, the ability to 
accurately examine almost all requirements will be impacted 
adversely.  This becomes more apparent when you consider 
that the ideal situation calls for running scenarios 
redundantly, in different operating conditions, to test the 
complete spectrum of conditions in which the Comanche will 
be expected to perform.  If limited resources force testers 
to combine scenarios, logic dictates that the ability to 
run redundant tests will also be limited.  This limited 
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amount of test data reflects directly on the confidence 
levels of the outcomes of IOTE.  These outcomes influence 
the decision-makers’ ultimate decision of accepting or 
rejecting the aircraft.  The small sample size of eight 
aircraft, coupled with limited flying during IOTE, could 
provide skewed data to the decision-makers. 
 
2. Test Area Layout 
 
To ensure the preponderance of funds allocated to IOTE 
actually test and evaluate the Comanche, the overhead of 
conducting IOTE must be kept to a minimum.  To accomplish 
this, all the ancillary costs associated with testing, 
measuring and capturing data need to be kept to a minimum.  
With reducing costs in mind, the test should be critically 
planned to achieve that end. 
When physically setting up a test, testers must 
emplace test equipment, survey its location, and validate 
its ability to provide the desired information.  All of 
this requires time and money.  Common sense dictates that 
these costs should be incurred only once if possible.  
Having to move the test equipment for each scenario 
significantly increases cost.  Not only does it increase 
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costs associated with the test equipment itself, but 
equates also to extra days on the range to accommodate the 
labor associated with moving/revalidating the test 
equipment.  With this in mind, the cost of IOTE can be 
reduced if the test equipment is laid out in such a fashion 
that the requirements of all the scenarios can be met. 
Figure 12 depicts a test layout that accomplishes 
this.  Around the periphery of the figure are ADA systems 
depicted by diamonds.  In the center of the figure are 
company sets of armor targets, interspersed with 
miscellaneous other ADA, artillery, and command and control 
vehicles.  
The missions associated with two of the scenarios are 
depicted on the figure to illustrate the objective of this 
test layout.  The long thin arrows show the flight route of 
a deep attack into ABFs used to engage the battalion set of 
armor targets.  The thick arrow representing an axis of 
attack, illustrates how the close combat with ground forces 
scenario can be run on the same test layout.   
This layout provides the ability to accomplish all the 
scenarios detailed in Chapter III.  Flying different routes 
around the periphery, turning on different sets of ADA 
systems, allows testers and evaluators to examine the 
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Comanches LO capabilities in the scenarios without allowing 
operators to “learn” the course.  At the same time the 
aircraft’s LO capabilities are examined, the extended range 
requirement is too.  The threat layout also accomplishes 
all the requirements of the scenarios if the test unit 
attacks, conducts reconnaissance, or screens from different 
directions/orientations.  Mixing target sets aids in 
presenting a different aspect to the testing unit as well.  
Based on the particular mission, testers can fashion the 
instructions given to the test unit to gain the information 



























  Figure 12.  IOTE Layout 40 X 40 78
E. FOLLOW ON TEST AND EVALUATION (FOTE) 
Items that may be tested during FOTE are those 
capabilities the aircraft will not have until the Block II 
aircraft are fielded in 2010.  A critical capability to 
test in FOTE then is Battle Command on the Move.  As 
detailed in the CONOPs section of Chapter II, Battle 
Command on the Move is one of the future missions the 
Comanche must be able to perform.  Since the fielding 
schedule already indicates this capability will not be 
fielded until two years after IOTE by the aircraft’s 
current fielding schedule, FOTE must evaluate Battle 
Command on the Move.  Additional items that should also be 
included in FOTE are capabilities planned to be included in 
IOTE but not fielded in time, and any capabilities that the 





The scenarios analyzed in this chapter provide a 
comprehensive means to test and evaluate the Comanche.  
Although there are several similarities in terms of 
MOPs/capabilities tested in each scenario, the scenarios 
were developed individually to test the critical 
capabilities the Comanche must possess.  However, if 
resources, primarily time or funding, become constrained, 
the scenarios can be combined.  Done correctly, maintaining 
the realistic operational focus of the individual 
scenarios, combined scenarios will provide ample test and 
evaluation data to make an informed IOTE decision.  Another 
method to conserve resources is to layout the IOTE in such 
a way that test instrumentation does not need to be moved 
and revalidated.  Follow on Test and Evaluation should 
focus on FCS capabilities not able to be tested, or 
capabilities that were deficient in IOTE.  
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The Army is embarking on drastic changes that affect 
the entire organization.  As the Army develops the Future 
Combat Systems, care must be given to ensure the systems 
developed and fielded meet the needs of the objective 
force.  IOTE plays a crucial part in this process. 
Current documents, which form the basis for IOTE, do 
not delineate all the requirements and measures of 
performance necessary to determine if the Comanche meets 
the needs of the user.  Only the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD), and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP) have been updated, but are still in draft form.  The 
dendritics and the OPMODSUM have not been updated.  In its 
present state, the OPMODSUM does not support end-to-end 
Future Combat Systems operations, focusing on the Comanche 
integrating into current legacy doctrine. 
The IOTE must model the Future Combat System 
requirements to the greatest extent possible.  Four basic 
scenarios suffice to evaluate the Comanche’s ability to 
meet FCS requirements, based upon the Block-fielding 
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schedule of the aircraft.  The future CONOP that cannot be 
evaluated in IOTE is Battle Command on the Move (BCOTM).  
This capability will not be fielded until 2010, with Block 
II aircraft.  Follow on Test and Evaluation must be planned 
and executed as soon as simulation and fielding plans allow 
the system to be evaluated against the BCOTM requirements. 
Ideally, all the scenarios will be run redundantly in 
as many different operating conditions as possible to 
provide complete data for evaluation.  However, the 
resources required for such extensive testing makes this 
unrealistic.  Obtaining sufficient data to make an IOTE 
decision should be possible and affordable using combined 





1. Model IOTE Scenarios After FCS Missions 
 
To accurately assess the Comanche’s ability to perform 
as an integral member of the Army team over the next 
quarter century, the aircraft must be tested and evaluated 
in the context of expected missions during the same period.  
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This assessment mandates a change to the requirements to 
include non-Army units.  In addition to internal Army 
components and systems, the Comanche must interoperate with 
other joint elements to an unprecedented level.  One of 
Comanche’s great tactical advantages is its ability to 
integrate and synthesize information from the entire air-
ground team.  To accurately assess this capability, all 
team members must take part in the IOTE. 
 
2. Combine Scenarios  
 
If resource shortfalls limit the number of scenarios 
that can be evaluated, combine scenarios.  This combination 
must be done while maintaining the ability to test the key 
capabilities that the Comanche must perform.  Taking 
operational shortcuts to save time and/or money in the 
testing process can skew data.  To limit the effect of 
reduced testing, testers must focus on keeping the test 
operationally sound.  Keeping the IOTE operationally sound 
provides accurate test results due to users accomplishing 
the missions as they have been trained, placing the 
aircraft in situations likely to be experienced in war. 
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3. Update the Operational Mode Summary 
 
The current Comanche OPMODSUM does not reflect the 
Army’s migration to the FCS.  Although all of the vignettes 
in the current OPMODSUM reflect aspects of the missions 
required by the FCS, none of them encompass the complete 
set of requirements outlined in the CONOPs.  The OPMODSUM 
must be updated to include all requirements the Comanche 
must perform as part of the FCS. 
 
4. Layout the Test to Maximize Resources 
 
IOTE test setup, is resource intensive.  Each of the 
systems used to detect/measure test events incur time and 
money costs.  The associated test equipment requires money 
expenditures to acquire for the test, and time expenditures 
to set up and validate before conducting the test.  Moving 
this equipment between test events incurs additional costs, 
due to the cost of transit time.  Any additional time 
required to conduct IOTE quickly adds up to significant 
expense when range time, equipment rental, maintenance, 
meals, lodging, and numerous other costs are factored in.  
Therefore, minimizing the time required to complete IOTE 
  84
leads to significant savings.  An additional benefit of 
minimizing the time required for IOTE is less burden on 
program schedule.  Positioning test equipment and measuring 
devices with minimal movement requirements, saves 
significant resources. 
 
C. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
  
The RAH-66 IOTE is currently scheduled for the spring 
of 2008.  Until that time, aircraft capabilities, and their 
associated timetable for inclusion, will undoubtedly 
change.  In fact, the Comanche program has just undergone a 
complete rescheduling at the end of 2001, in which the 
program added two years to the timetable.  This rebaseline 
also included the introduction of Blocking aircraft 
production.  Blocking allows for aircraft to be fielded 
with different capabilities as the technology, or the 
ability to incorporate it into the aircraft, matures.  Also 
during the time up to the Comanche IOTE, other systems that 
will comprise the FCS will be designed and perhaps fielded.  
To the greatest degree possible, those systems that will 
interact with the Comanche must be included in the IOTE. 
  85
 Further and continuous study must be given to keep the 
IOTE applicable and current in relation to the FCS.  If the 
program schedule slides again, or capabilities within the 
aircraft are fielded at a different pace than anticipated, 
the IOTE must change to reflect this.  One of the key 
capabilities that must be investigated is the Comanche’s 
ability to perform Battle Command on the Move.  This 
capability is scheduled to be included in the aircraft in 
2010, with the fielding of the Block II aircraft.  
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APPENDIX A.  EXECUTION MATRIX FOR RECON TO MOBILE 
STRIKE 
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This scenario, more than any other, stresses the Comanche’s ability to meet its flying speed, 
auxiliary fuel, BLOS/NLOS communication, Low Observability, off-board sensor integration, and joint 
engagement requirements. Although almost all MOPs can be tested and evaluated, the limited number of 
targets will not stress the Comanche’s ability to observe, acquire and prioritize targets in various 
battlefield conditions to the extent of other scenarios.  Likewise, the Comanche’s ability to 
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APPENDIX B.  EXECUTION MATRIX FOR CLOSE COMBAT WITH 
GROUND FORCES 
TIME H-hour – H+1 H+1 – H+2 H+2 – H+3 H+3 -  
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This scenario focuses on air-ground interoperability.  Maintaining situational awareness 
during rapid joint air-ground maneuver, especially with heavy enemy contact, is extremely 
difficult.  The Comanche MEP must assimilate and share necessary information between all 
team members, helping to build an accurate common operating picture.  Accurate 
information sharing becomes more critical as SWTs rotate into and out of the FARP.  Total 
situational awareness must be maintained to prevent loss of aircraft, or loss of enemy 
contact. Comanche sensors must detect, identify and destroy enemy forces at extended 
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APPENDIX C.  EXECUTION MATRIX FOR MOBILE STRIKE 
TIME H-HOUR – H+15 H+15 – H+35 H+35 – H1+25 H1+25 – H1+45 H1+45 –   
EVENT ATKHC crosses 
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This scenario focuses on the Comanche’s lethality in a target rich environment.  Utilizing it’s advanced 
systems, the aircraft should be able to quickly maneuver to a firing position, scan for targets, 
prioritize, and then assign targets to the entire team of Comanches.  Engagements should be quick and 
deadly, with all aircraft firing near simultaneously. This scenario also tests the aircrafts ability to 
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APPENDIX D.  EXECUTION MATRIX FOR MULTI-MODAL 
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER 
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This scenario tests the Comanche’s ability to work with several different maneuver units 
operating in close proximity on the battlefield.  The aircraft must be able to differentiate 
between friendly organizational, non-organizational and enemy vehicles. The common operating 
picture must be accurate enough to allow the squadron’s aircraft to be given a new mission, 
with another ground element, without having to spend an inordinate amount of time on the 
radio or conducting a face-to-face meeting.  Further, as teams rotate to and from the FARP, 
the Comanche’s systems must develop and sustain a common operating picture that allows quick 
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